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The notion of "person" has a distinctly Christian pedigree. As an idea, it 
has stimulated in Christian tradition deep philosophical and theological 
reflection which we hope to explore. Today the exigency for such an 
exploration arises more immediately in the practical order, where certain 
contemporary ethical issues like killing the unborn or withholding food 
from the irreversibly comatose are inextricably bound up with 
determining if the unborn or comatose patient is a person. Such a 
determination will be beyond reach, however, if, in the theoretical order 
our notion of person does not exceed the strictures of empirical science. 
Moralists in the field of bioethics are surely aware of that. 1 It is time now to 
reclaim the Christian notion of person and put it at the center of ethical 
reflection. 
In proceeding this way, we are not, of course, breaking new ground. 
Rather we are merely taking our lead from Vatican Council II which, 
relative to previous Church councils, was the first to give sustained 
attention in the document, "Gaudium et Spes" to the Christian 
understanding ofthe person. That in the wake ofthe council the person has 
remained central to Catholic moral reasoning is evidenced, for example, in 
the 1975 Vatican Declaration on sexual ethics. Though contested by some 
theologians, the moral methodology of the declaration is unmistakably 
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that of Vatican II with its concentration on the human person. 2 In a lecture 
just recently published, Cardinal Ratzinger, of the Congregation of the 
Doctrine of the Faith, spoke to the issue of technology and reproduction 
and raised the question of the person. 3 Finally, it should be added, too, 
that in philosophical and religious writing, no Pope has ever addressed the 
question of the person more systematically and consistently than John 
Paul 11.4 
Our procedure will be simple. We will explore the notion of person first 
philosophically and theologically and then conclude by seeing what 
bearing the Christian understanding of the person has on the issue of 
withholding nourishment from a comatose patient. 
Metaphysics 
From the outset, it should be pointed out that the foundation of the 
Church's understanding of the person comes from metaphysics, a branch 
of philosophy concerned with the nature and existence of all reality. Called 
the "science of being", metaphysics deals with all being, whether material 
or spiritual, and views it in terms of such principles as "essence" and 
"existence", "act" and "potency", ''form'' and "matter", "substance" and 
"accidents". As we explore a particular instance of being, namely, that of 
the person, we will have a chance to explain these words.5 
The metaphysical system according to which the Church understands 
the person, derives from Aristotle and his greatest follower succeeding him 
by 1,500 years, St. Thomas Aquinas. By enlisting metaphysics, the Church 
in no way excludes other branches of science which can serve her 
understanding ofthose matters relevant to her faith. We may add too that 
long before the advent of modern science, philosophy and metaphysics 
accorded the Church her greatest gains in understanding and enunciating 
the mysteries of her faith. Nowhere is this more evident than in the 
mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation, where the issues concern 
respectively the being of one God Who is, nevertheless, three persons and 
the being of one Person, Jesus Christ, Who has, nevertheless, two natures, 
the human and the divine. 
We specifically mention these mysteries of the Trinity and the 
Incarnation because they are the precise locus in which the notion of the 
person arises in Christian tradition. While the word "person," as we shall 
see, had an ancient lineage, the meaning of the word achieved its clearest 
definition in Christian revelation. There, once the word had been 
domesticated, it was, according to St. Thomas, the most fitting of all terms 
to ascribe to God. 
'Person' means that which is most perfect in the whole of nature, namely, what 
subsists in rational nature. Now since every kind of perfection should be 
attributed to God, because his nature contains every perfection, it is fitting that 
the word 'person' should be used of God.6 
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The word "person" seems to be of Etruscan origin and referred to the 
mask worn by the devotees of the goddess Phersu. Later, making its way 
into the Roman theatre, the mask was fashioned according to the 
character or role being portrayed. With a play on words, the Romans 
called the mask the "persona" (from the Latin per sonare, to speak 
through) since it was that through which the actor spoke. While in the 
beginning the "persona" was a visual, acoustic and dramatic device, by the 
time of Cicero (lst century, RC.) the word has assumed the meanings 
commonly associated with person, namely, a concrete personage, a 
juridical being with legal rights and duties, and finally, a human 
individ ual. 7 
"An individual substance of a rational nature" 
As we said above, it was the adoption by Christianity of the word 
"person" that prompted its receiving further precision. The 3rd century 
lawyer and theologian, Tertullian, made in reference to Christ a 
remarkable statement which went unnoticed at the time, but anticipated 
what the great ecumenical councils were later to say about the Trinity and 
Christ. Tertullian called Christ a "person," a word not found in the 
Scriptures. "We see two states that are not confused but conjoined in one 
person, Jesus, God and man."8 
It would take us too far afield to outline the sometimes bloody debates 
that occurred at the councils of Nicea and Chalcedon where the early 
Church defined its biblical faith in categories amenable to the Greco-
Roman mentality. Suffice it to say that the councils transposed into 
metaphysical terms the biblical revelation of a God Who, though one, was 
also in some way three and of a Jesus Who, though one, was also somehow 
two. Confusing? It would have been impossible for the young Church 
convincingly to express her faith both in the Triune God and in the 
God-man, Jesus, had not the notion of person been available to her. 
According to the conciliar statements, 
Persona referred to that which is threefold in the Trinity and one in Christ; [while] 
natura or substantia, later also essentia, designated that which is one in the 
Trinity and dual in Christ.9 
Surprisingly, in maintaining that God was three persons with one 
(divine) nature and that Christ was one person with two natures (human 
and divine), the early councils had left the word "person" undefined. It was 
the 6th century philosopher-statesman Boethius who was the first to define 
the person. According to him a person is "an individual substance of 
rational nature". 
Boethius drew on metaphysics which employed terms that were precise 
and technical. And herein lies our contemporary difficulty. Steeped in the 
empirical world of science and technology, our modern mentality balks at 
metaphysical thinking, especially the categories of the ancients. The word 
"substance," for example, is a fairly good indicator of how far we have 
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come from metaphysical thought. Today, substance denotes something 
material as in the expression "substance abuse" or "controlled substance". 
Yet to Boethius, following Aristotle, a substance is any being that exists in 
itself, a self-contained entity, a subject of properties. Where a being, such 
as color, shape, weight, required another for its existence, this was 
designated an "accident". An accident, like the crease in one's pants, could 
exist only by inhering in a substance. Even in speaking of an accident, we 
can discern how removed we are from Boethius. For us an "accident" 
occurs on the thruway or when a toilet is not reached. 
The metaphysical term "nature" fares a bit better with modern man. 
Though we often associate it with flora and fauna, as in the expression 
"mother nature", we do admit an abstract use of the word when, for 
example, we say that it is in man's nature to laugh or to make tools. 
Technically speaking, nature is the intrinsic principle of operation by 
which a being acts in a way proper to its kind. For the record, we may. add 
that the word "essence" is often used as a synonym for nature when viewed 
in the abstract. When nature is not viewed in the abstract, but as concretely 
existing, it receives the name "form". In the lexicon of metaphysics, form is 
not, as the word connotes today, shape or size. Because of its importance 
for our later discussion, we should look more closely at this idea of form 
and its correlative idea, "matter". 
All Natures are Composite Beings 
Since for the most part every kind of being is material, metaphysics 
concludes that with the exception of God and angels, all natures are 
composite beings, that is, beings constituted by two principles, "form" and 
"matter". 
In Aristotle's system, matter is not a substance either in the common or 
metaphysical sense. Rather, matter is a principle which connotes 
indeterminancy and potentiality. Only in conjunction with its correlative 
principle, form, can matter be actualized and configured into the 
recognizable stuff we associate with a rock or a tree or a man. While matter 
is pure potency waiting to become something, form is the activating 
principle which organizes matter to be a particular something and, as it 
were, shows through it so that we can recognize a rock as essentially 
different from a tree and a tree as essentially different from a man. Each of 
these aforementioned entities has a different nature or essence which, 
thanks to the form, is concretely realized. 
Thus, with the exception of the divine and angelic natures, every nature 
is a composite of form and matter. Where the nature is living, its form is 
called "soul". Every living creature possesses a soul. That of a plant differs 
from that of an animal which differs from that of a man. Since the form 
gives existence to the nature, the soul of a man, for example, enables him to 
share a common nature or essence with all men. Within a common essence 
or nature, what distinguishes one creature from another, however, 
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is matter. Matter once in-formed is the principle of individuation. In 
human nature, that matter is usually referred to as a "body". Incidentally, 
the ancients came to believe that in vegetative and animal natures, soul and 
matter were extinguished together at death but in human nature, despite 
the death of the body, the soul remained immortal. 
Let us return finally to Boethius. Besides his use of the words 
"substance" and "nature", Boethius uses the qualifiers "individual" and 
"rational". The latter term maintains its self-evidence today as it did when 
Aristotle used it. "Rational" qualifies a being as intellective, that is, as 
possessing the power to know and to choose - spiritual acts that enable 
the possessor to transcend the material order. "Individual", as Boethius 
intends the term, means simply singular and apart but not necessarily in 
virtue of matter. 
Thus, in his definition, Boethius has conceived the person as a distinct, 
self-contained entity which reasons and chooses. Having wound our way 
through metaphysics, we probably feel a certain disappointment. Whether 
viewed from the perspective of common sense or metaphysics, Bioethius's 
conception hardly qualifies as earth-shattering. All he has told us is that a 
person is an individual instance of human nature. But, in fact, Boethius has 
done something far more important. In the wake of the ecumenical 
councils concerned with the triune God and the dual-natured Christ, 
Boethius, with his definition, has claimed for theology the philosophical 
notion of person. In so doing, he has established in Christian thought an 
analogical relationship between the person of God and the person of man. 
Consequently, 
The unique trinitarian or christological content that the concept acquires in 
theology casts its light back upon the general (or philosophical) understanding 
without the latter having, therefore, to leave the realm of what is generally 
human. If this is the case, then it can be asserted from the outset .. . that the word 
person in the sense of human being, and in contradistinction to mere 
individuality, receives its special dignity in history when it is illuminated by the 
unique theological meaning. 10 
St. Thomas took over Boethius's definition and further reflected on its 
applicability to those in the Trinity. In acknowledging, like St. Augustine 
before him, the unique relations enjoyed by the Father, Son and Spirit, 
Thomas concluded to what he called "incommunicability". 11 In his use of 
the term, Thomas extrapolated from the notions of substance and 
rationality further characteristics, namely, that a person is a complete 
nature, possesses the nature as his own and stands separate from others. 
For Thomas, incommunicability is not a failure to communicate but 
rather the very basis for any human intercourse: the realization that the 
human subject is a distinct "I". 
Notion of Incommunicability 
Thomas's notion of incommunicability as predicated of the divine 
Persons has definite ramifications for understanding the human person. 
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No longer is the human person a faceless individual of the species, a 
concrete example of an abstraction. In possessing, rather than in being 
possessed by, a rational nature, the human person as complete and unique, 
stands master of his own thinking and choosing. This self-possession, 
albeit as one sharing human nature, earns from Thomas the comment that 
a person is distinguished from all other natures by his "dignity". 12 In fact, 
of all the composite natures, nothing exceeds in dignity that of the person. 
What then, does the Christian notion of person add to Boethius's mere 
philosophical definition? The Christian notion adds to the person those 
qualities bespeaking "the uniqueness, the incomparability and therefore 
irreplaceability of the individual."13 
It was because the term person could be used analogously of both God 
and man that Thomas concluded to the incomparable dignity and 
uniqueness of each human being. Incidentally, long before Thomas, St. 
Augustine, without benefit of Boethius's definition, has pressed the 
analogy to conclude that as God possessed one divine nature within which 
there existed three independent but mutual relations - Father, Son and 
Spirit - a man possessed a human nature with the triple powers of 
memory, understanding and will. Whether like Thomas we view man's 
personal dignity in terms of God's dignity or like Augustine see man's 
intellective powers in terms of God's tri-personallife, the point is that the 
precise locus for understanding the Catholic notion of person is the 
mystery of God. 
God's "Image and Likeness" 
For Augustine, Boethius and Thomas, the mystery of God revealed 
itself in sacra pagina, sacred scripture, which was the unquestioned 
starting point for any speCUlation. If they maintained in the speculative 
order an analogical relationship between the person of God and the person 
of man; it was because the Bible revealed that relationship really existing in 
the natural order created by God. For Genesis recounts that in creating the 
world, God made in His own "image and likeness" the man who was called 
Adam (1:26). Thus, even before Boethius defined person philosophically, 
the Greek and Latin Fathers found its meaning within the biblical data. 14 
As we know from the first chapter of Genesis, God crowned His creation 
with man and gave him dominion over the earth. Although in the story of 
creation, man's composite nature is clearly manifest, the early Fathers 
emphasized one-sidedly man's intellectual and volitional powers as 
likening him to God. Viewing man's inner form or soul as imaging God, 
the Fathers tended to denigrate man's bodily nature. Despite this 
weakness, they were unanimous in conceiving man as a person who stands 
in an immediate relation to God. 
Man exists in lively exchange with his creator and this destiny is not added to his 
substantial nature but enters into his very constitution. IS 
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That man's very nature or constitution is in itself an exchange with God, \ 
stems from the biblical fact that God imparted His own breath into man's ~ 
nostrils (Gen.2:7). To animate man who was mere dust, God infused into 
him an immortal soul. The soul's source, therefore, is God. 
Through the breathing of God there appears in man a "Thou" who belongs to 
God and is the "image of God," for this "Thou" is able to say "I" in its own right, 
and in its own right can also address God as "Thou." Out of nothing God provides 
Himself with a partner for dialogue .... '6 
Every person, therefore, comes from God . In virtue of his God-given 
soul, man is a "thou" whose spiritual nature images that of God. In 
metaphysical thought, if we pardon its intrusion here, the imparting of 
existence to a nature through the form is called "first act". In the case of 
man, first acting is the imparting of existence to human nature through the 
soul. Obviously, "first" implies a "second". In metaphysics, "second act" 
refers to the operations of the powers inherent in the nature. In the case of 
man, second act is the operations of his powers ofthinking and willing. In 
admitting, therefore, the distinction between a nature and its operations, 
we can say of man that in virtue of his soul, man's first act is to be a "thou," 
while in the virtue of his operative powers of knowing and choosing, his 
second act is "to say 'I' [and to] address God as 'Thou.'" If in man, first act 
images the one God in him, second act involving multiple powers likens 
him to the Trinity.17 Be that as it may, man, by his nature and its 
operations, is equipped for an inter-personal relation with God. In short, 
the human person is inherently destined for God. 
While it can be said that a person's very existence is intended to be his 
relationship to God, 18 it follows in virtue of a person's material nature that 
he enjoys another relationship. As a corporeal creature, the person is 
related to the entire cosmos. But, similar to his relation with God, so with 
the world, the person has a peculiarly unique relation. 
Genesis reveals that after forming man from the earth's dust (2:7), God 
commissioned him to subdue the earth and to take charge of it (I :26-28). 
Having made the world for man, God entrusts it to him and places man at 
its summit. In the created order, therefore, man becomes God's "stand-in" 
and exercises a certain lordship not unlike that of God Himself. 
This likeness makes man similar to God in that man represents God as lord of 
. creation, behaves as his delegate so that creation has a certain subservience to 
him.'· 
The view that man is God's surrogate in the world adds a new depth of 
understanding to the notion of man as God's image and likeness. Not only 
is man an "I" who has a personal relation with God, but vis-a-vis the 
material world stands with God in a "partnership" as welPo In keeping 
with his dignity as God's representative, man is to exercise in creation the 
powers bestowed on him, using the world in the service of his dialogue with 
God. Seen in functional terms then, man has a God-appointed role to care 
for all creatures over whom he stands as lord. 
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'Far Afield' Approach 
It would take us too far afield to explore the biblical account of man's 
failure in his relation and partnership with God and the disruption that 
ensued in the created order. Viewing the consequences of man's "fall", the 
Latin and Greek Fathers regarded man's sin as sullying, but not removing, 
from his nature the image of God. Until the coming of Christ Who is "the 
image of the invisible God" (Col.l: 15), man's nature lay wounded, his 
powers enfeebled. Such was the effect of a sin which St. Athanasius 
claimed resulted when Adam, turning from God, turned in on himself. 
Thus, the first sin was "essentially egoism and egocentrism; and by that 
man lost his true center in God".21 
Irrespective of man's weakness, the biblical account of man is 
unparalleled in the dignity it accords him. How revolutionary this idea of 
the person was can be gauged from the reproach it earned fom certain 
pagan philosophers who viewed man as but an element in a world subject 
to immutable laws. To these pagans, the epitome of arrogance was the 
Christian idea of the person since it posited a Creator-God Who made 
human beings the subject of a unique and special providence. In this 
post-Darwinian age, some modern evolutionists balk at the idea, tOO. 22 
We see, therefore, that in acquiring the metaphysical notion of person, 
Christian theology invested it with a content beyond that of pagan 
philosophy. No longer a mere individuality possessing a rational nature, 
the person was as first act a self related to God as origin and goal. Man's 
nature then is his destiny since to speak of man as person or self implies an 
essence meant for God. 
If, however, no further explanation were given, this view of the person 
would be deficient for failing to mention the sovereign freedom man has to 
accept or reject his nature and destiny. But Christian realism, in light ofthe 
"fall", has never ignored human freedom. Consequently, Christian 
theology has always recognized man as something more than an individual 
substance endowed by nature with intellective and volitional powers. 
From the beginning, even without benefit of the term person, theology 
regarded man as a subject in possession of his nature and its powers the 
exercise of which showed him to be unique and irreducible. Thus, 
antecedent to his powers stood the subject which philosophy, as we have 
already mentioned, distinguished as first and second act. The point is that 
within his powers ~s a person a man may accept or reject his nature and 
destiny to be God's reflection and the steward of creation. Hence it follows 
that: 
He cannot free himself from his responsibility by appealing to a common nature 
of which he would be only a simple example and which according to the 
circumstances would move him by its instincts.22 
St. Thomas was well aware of this when he attributed to the person 
incommunicability. He accorded the person the unique power to perfect 
his nature and realize his destiny before God. 
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Before drawing out in the bioethical area the practical ramifications of 
the Christian notion of person, we must add a quick word about its further 
evolution. In brief, we can say that in consequence of the great historical 
and cultural changes occurring in the 17th and 18th centuries, the person 
became an object of reflection less from a metaphysical and more from a 
psychological point of view. 
If Luther, in the realm of religion, sought the assurance of personal 
salvation through faith alone (sola fides), Locke and Descartes in the 
realm of philosophy sought human certitude in human intellectual 
processes. In both the religious and philosophical realms, therefore, a 
movement inward occurred attaining "a high degree of self-consciousness 
of a certain introverted sort". 23 Paradoxically, this introversion took place 
at the very time when Western civilization was moving outward to discover 
new worlds and new wealth. In the wake of the impact on social and 
political institutions of what was already being called "the modern age", 
emancipated man became more sensitive to his "inalienable rights." This 
sensitivity became the soil of a powerful individualism. When nurtured by 
an introverted consciousness of self, this individualism forced the 
traditional notion of person to be recast in terms which psychology and 
psychoanalysis made explicable. Henceforth, the person becomes his 
psyche, a private enclosure whose interiority is a function of his 
consciousness. 
Contribution of Positive Insights 
The posItive insights which this modern notion contributes to our 
understanding of the person must be acknowledged. While we rightly 
acclaim the genius of Freud for discovering the unconscious, we 
customarily overlook the prior achievement of modern philosophy in 
conceiving the person as the subject of consciousness. In its attention to 
man as a knowing subject, modern philosophy has brought to the fore his 
refleCtive activity whereby he plumbs the depth of his individuality. 
Irrespective of the contemporary question whether man can lay hold of the 
ultimate subject which underlies his reflective acts,24 modern philosophy 
has vigorously pursued the elusive and mysterious "I" wherever it appears 
- in literature, in the social and empirical sciences, and particularly today, 
in medicine. 
Another positive insight we have gained from contemporary reflection 
on the person is the clearer distinction between person and personality. 
The word "I" identifies the person as the ultimate subject of all his activities 
like thinking, choosing, desiring, imagining, etc. Beneath those activities, 
however, there remains a perdu ring, invariant, stable substratum, 
Boethius's "individual substance", which grounds all experience, past, 
present and future and enables the individual to recognize that he is the 
same self at one month old, 20 years old and 90 years old. In a real sense, 
therefore, the "I," though immersed in the events of space and time, floats 
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free of them. While transcending the physical world, the "I" nonetheless 
reacts to it. In his reaction, each incommunicable person disposes of 
himself in a manner proper only to him. Herein lies the distinction between 
person and personality. That special disposition or mode of behaving and 
reacting unique to each person is what contemporary thought calls 
"personality. " 
For the person, personality is an acquisition, an accidental modifi-
cation, a habitual manner of exchange with the environment. However 
person be defined, personality is the uniquely characteristic way each 
person has of being himself. From the welter of experiences which engage 
the person on all levels, there emerges a:. unified pattern of responses in 
large measure freely chosen. Thus, 
Personality is constituted by what one does; it is the product of one's free activity. 
The basic reality behind personality is habit; not this or that habit, but the 
integrated and harmonized union of all one's consciously acquired habits.'s 
While heredity, education, culture and environment are significant 
factors in the development of personality, they are ultimately not 
determinative. Personality is the free decision of the person; he chooses 
how he wants to be himself. 
Finally, on the debit side, we must add that the modern notion of person 
which holds the field today has, in effect, led to the equation of self with 
consciousness. Consistent with psychology, such a notion regards the 
person in function of his reflective acts, actual or potential. The "knowing 
self' is the person. With profound legal and ethical consequences, the 
modern view, therefore, defines the essence of the person in terms of the 
interiority of consciousness. 26 Obviously, since neither a fetus nor a 
comatose patient has that interiority, it is not surprising that physicians 
inquire as to their ethical obligations in treating such individuals. 
The Comatose Patient: Withholding Nutrition 
Who realizes better than physicians that in the human organism 
intelligence and freedom have their physiological bases in the central 
nervous system and particularly in the frontal lobes of the cerebral cortex? 
When this small but intricate part of the brain is impaired, the person not 
only ceases intelligent and free activity but "sinks back into the 
deterministic reflexes or physiological reactions of the animal or vegetative 
level of functioning".27 In the case of a comatose patient, that is, one in a 
persistent vegetative state (PVS), it is painfully clear how intimate the 
connection is between proper bodily functioning and the distinctly 
spiritual acts of thinking and choosing which we associate with a person. 
Where such acts, according to all indications, can no longer be expected of 
the PVS patient, there arises in his regard the medical-ethical question of 
continuing or withdrawing enteral or parenteral nutrition. 
In response to this question, moralists have taken one of two avenues of 
approach: either that founded on the distinction between ordinary and 
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extraordinary means or that based on judgments concerning "quality of 
life".28 We will briefly characterize each approach because of its relevance 
both to the question at hand and, more importantly, to the aim we stated at 
the beginning of this paper, namely, to put the Christian notion of person 
at the center of ethical reflection. 
The distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means dates from 
the 17th century and is a descriptive classification of the procedures or 
technologies available in health care. On the basis of this distinction, a 
patient whose life or health is at stake need feel no ethical obligation to 
have recourse to extraordinary means. However, because today's 
advances in medical technology have made classification extremely 
difficult, as we see in the matter of artificial nutrition and hydration, 
evaluative criteria have become more explicit. Thus, the means, 
understood to include the type of treatment, its degree of complexity or 
risk, its cost and availability are weighed against "the result that can be 
expected".29 With a benefit-burden ratio, the ordinary / extraordinary 
distinction considers not only medical techniques but their effects on the 
patient. As a result, a procedure may be judged, on the one hand, ordinary 
if its effects on a patient are more beneficial than burdensome; on the 
other, extraordinary, if the effects are the reverse. 30 
Markedly different from this ethical approach is that based on quality of 
life judgments. Where in the ordinary / extraordinary distinction, medical 
means and their effects on the patient are the focus of evaluation, in quality 
of life judgments the focus of evaluation is the patient's life itself. Such 
judgments calculate the value of the patient's life either in terms of certain 
"indicators of humanhood," (e.g., minimal intelligence, self-awareness, "-
self-control, capability to relate to others, etc.},3l or in terms of a 
"qualitative relation between [his] overall condition and the pursuit of 
values",32 or simply in terms of the standards set by society, the family or 
the patient himself. 
Jobes Case 
Relative to this quality of life ethic, the recent case of Nancy Ellen Jobes 
and the New Jersey Catholic Conference of Bishops is instructive. Acting 
as amicus curiae in November, 1986, the Conference filed a brief 
requesting that the state Supreme Court not allow the withdrawal of food 
and fluids from Mrs. Jobes, a PVS patient. Within its argumentation, the 
Conference advised the court "carefully to avoid any decision which draws 
its conclusions from an analysis of the 'quality oflife' of the patient". The 
Conference also reminded the court of its own earlier determination to 
reject decisions "based on assessments of the personal worth or social 
utility of another's life, or the value of that life to others".33 Like the 
National Conference of Catholic Bishops, the New Jersey bishops roundly 
reject the quality of life approach because it attempts to measure the value 
of human life. Undoubtedly, the Catholic bishops would concur with the 
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following assessment, 
The characteristic feature of a typical 'quality of life' ethic is that it rejects the 
principle of the equality of human lives and with that rejects the equality of 
human persons. 34 
Without going into detail, we should pursue, for a moment, the Nancy 
Jobes case and that more recently of Marcia Gray whose spouse sought the 
opinion of the Catholic bishop of Rhode Island with regard to the removal 
of nutrition and hydration. 35 In both cases, the argumentation relied on 
the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means and, ironically, 
drew opposite conclusions. On the surface these opposite conclusions 
seem to tell against the usefulness of the ordinary I extraordinary 
distinction. Yet, in reality, the descriptive and evaluative criteria of the 
distinction were sufficient for both the New Jersey bishops and the bishops 
of Rhode Island to judge in their respective cases whether the removal of 
artificial nutrition constituted euthanasia. 
In the case of Mrs. Gray, the bishop of Rhode Island concluded that 
there was no intention to cause her death and that in light of its effects, 
artificial feeding was futile, devoid of benefit, and a cause both of suffering 
to her and of economic burden to her family. He, therefore, judged the 
means extraordinary and non-obligatory. The New Jersey bishops 
concluded that in the case of Nancy Jobes, the removal of fOQd and water 
would directly cause death and thus constitute active euthanasia. In light 
of their premise that the provision of food and water to a patient is basic 
"normal care" to be distinguished from medical treatment, the bishops, 
therefore, judged the means ordinary and obligatory. 
Since the telling point in both cases is the burden-benefit ratio resultant 
upon the use of artificial nutrition and hydration, the bishop of Rhode 
Island could, without contradiction, accept the premise of his colleagues in 
New Jersey while they in turn, could, without contradiction, accept his 
conclusion. For though feeding can rightly be classified as ordinary, 
normal care yet in its effect on a patient, for example, one suffering from 
stomach and intestinal cancer, it can constitute an insufferable or 
extraordinary burden. 
We underscore the fact that in the arguments advanced on behalf of 
Gray and Jobes, the bishops, specifically those in New Jersey, made 
repeated appeal to the dignity of the human person. What is highly 
significant in their appeal is that the bishops distinguished the religious 
tradition informing their moral principles from "a common respect for the 
dignity of the human person." Admitting that their religious principles 
sharpen their concern for human dignity, the bishops, nevertheless, assert 
that their teaching is "grounded in respect for the dignity and fundamental 
rights of the human person and cannot be rejected on grounds of political 
and religious pluralism". In other words, the bishops are claiming with 
regard to the person a truth that is objective and inescapable. What is that 
truth? 
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Universally recognized , that truth, of course, is the inherent dignity of 
the human person. For the New Jersey bishops, as we said earlier, that 
dignity is not adequately articulated in a quality of life approach. We can 
argue that the fundamental reason for this inadequacy lies in the fact that, 
at base, all quality oflife judgments rest on a psychological understanding 
ofthe person. In such judgments, the value ofthe person inheres in the self 
as a conscious reflective person. The medieval philosophers referred to this 
activated mode of being as "second act". But clearly there is an actuality 
prior to this which common sense recognizes when it acknowledges that 
even in sleep or under an anesthetic, a person still exists. For this reason, 
people readily accept that a person is more than his conscious acts, is more 
than his personality, that a person exists despite either a temporary or 
permanent incapacity for introversion, as in the case, respectively, of a 
baby or severely retarded individual. In truth, then, the person's dignity 
which earns our "common respect" inheres primarily, not in his acts and 
operations, but in his very being. 
Comatose Patient 'A Distinct Entity' 
On the empirical level, we recognize that the comatose patient is a 
distinct entity, an "individual substance". When independent of life-
support machines, the body of the comatose patient is obviously self-
animating, or to put it more precisely, animated from within by an intrinsic 
principle called the soul. Naturally, without the soul the body would 
perish. As ''first act", the soul is the "form" organizing and suffusing the 
bodily matter and enabling man's human nature to exist. It is the very 
"essence" or "nature" of man to be rational, that is, to possess intellective 
and volitional powers. Even when these powers are inoperative due to 
sleep; anesthetic, retardation or brain damage, rational nature continues 
to exist. Thus, the comatose patient is "an individual substance of a 
rational nature". On the metaphysical level, he is a "person". 
Although incapacitated with regard to acts oflocomotion and, as far as 
we can tell, of thinking and willing, the PVS patient continues to possess 
human nature. His very existence testifies to this possession in virtue of 
which he remains a unique "self'. As a separate individual composed of 
body and soul, he retains "incommunicability", that attribute which 
distinguishes him as an "I" from every other "thou". According to St. 
Thomas, this attribute is peculiar to the person and constitutes his dignity. 
It appears, therefore, that the bishops' appeal to "a common respect for the 
dignity of the human person" has validity only insofar as people continue 
to recognize and treat each other as other "selves". The practice of 
euthanasia seriously threatens that common respect, specifically in the 
case of comatose patients. 
In citing this "common respect", the bishops also made reference to their 
"Judeo-Christian heritage" and their "religious principles". In their brief to 
the court, the bishops only alluded to these elements as serving to 
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"sharpen" concern for human dignity. It would not, of course, have been 
fitting to argue them in a secular forum, although they surface in the 
bishops' allusions to life as "a sacred trust", or as a matter of 
"stewardship". The bishops, therefore, did not propose for the court's 
consideration a theological view of the human person. 
Be that as it may, a theological view of the person is, however, requisite 
for any Catholic physician who takes Jesus' words to heart : "Whatever you 
do to the least of these, you do to me" (Mt.2S:40). The comatose patient, 
though totally incapacitated, remains God's "image and likeness." 
Endowed with a soul, God's life-giving breath, he stands in an immediate 
relation to God as his origin and goal. No one is privy, of course, to that 
mysterious dialogue which transpires between God and the soul of the 
comatose patient. Where to all appearances, his worldly stewardship has 
ceased, obviously that of the physician has not. In the service of his 
comatose patient, the physician must provide the normal care of nutrition 
and hydration as he would for any patient. The condition of a comatose 
patient in no way diminishes his human dignity which is the equal of the 
physician himself. For like the physician, the comatose patient, too, is a 
person - unique, irreplaceable and destined for God. 
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